Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games

Economic Theory

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 321-339

  Kosfeld, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Evolution; Strategy adjustment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036768836     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990100223     Document Type: Article

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