Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-14

  Börgers, Tilman ^a   Sarin, Rajiv ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031281590     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2319     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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