Darwinian adaptation, population genetics and the streetcar theory of evolution

Journal of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 34, Issue 5-6, 1996, Pages 511-532

  Hammerstein, Peter ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR ORNITHOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Adaptation; Epistasis; ESS; Long term evolution; N locus genetics; Nash equilibrium; Optimality; Rationality paradox

Indexed keywords

ANIMAL; ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; MATHEMATICS; PHENOTYPE; POPULATION GENETICS;

ANIMALS; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; GENETICS, POPULATION; HUMANS; MATHEMATICS; MODELS, GENETIC; PHENOTYPE; SELECTION (GENETICS);

EID: 0029706136     PISSN: 03036812     EISSN: 14321416     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02409748     Document Type: Article

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