Evolutionary stability in strategic models of single-locus frequency-dependent viability selection

Journal of Mathematical Biology

Volumn 34, Issue 7, 1996, Pages 707-733

  Cressman, R ^a,c   Hofbauer, J ^a,b   Hines, W G S ^a,b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

Author keywords

Evolutionary stability; Frequency dependent selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001648943     PISSN: 03036812     EISSN: 14321416     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf00161516     Document Type: Article

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