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Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 340-366

A behavioral learning process in games

Author keywords

Evolution; Learning; Nash equilibrium; Polya urn; Reinforcement

Indexed keywords


EID: 0035193141     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0841     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (59)

References (27)
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    • New York: Wiley
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    • mimeo, 95-6 CNAM Paris
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  • 19
    • 0001000786 scopus 로고
    • "Non-Convergence to Unstable Points in Urn Models and Stochastic Approximations"
    • (1989) Ann. Prob , vol.18 , pp. 698-712
    • Pemantle, R.1
  • 20
    • 0031287487 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Cycling in a Stochastic Learning Algorithm for Normal Form Games"
    • (1997) J. Evol. Econ , vol.7 , pp. 193-207
    • Posch, M.1
  • 23
  • 26
    • 0004202581 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary game theory
    • Cambridge MA: MIT Press
    • (1995)
    • Weibull, J.1
  • 27
    • 0003538369 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Individual strategy and social structure
    • Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
    • (1998)
    • Young, P.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.