메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-19

An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly

Author keywords

Evolution; mutation; imitation; bertrand oligopoly

Indexed keywords


EID: 17944393169     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0765     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (54)

References (11)
  • 1
    • 0041474330 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Evolutionary Model of Market Structure
    • G. van der Laan, J.-J. Herings, & D. Talman. Amsterdam: North Holland
    • Alós-Ferrer C., Ania A. B., Vega-Redondo F. An Evolutionary Model of Market Structure. van der Laan G., Herings J.-J., Talman D. Theory of Markets and its Functioning. 1999;139-163 North Holland, Amsterdam.
    • (1999) Theory of Markets and Its Functioning , pp. 139-163
    • Alós-Ferrer, C.1    Ania, A.B.2    Vega-Redondo, F.3
  • 2
    • 0003127995 scopus 로고
    • On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium
    • Dastidar K. G. On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium. Econ. Theory. 5:1995;19-32.
    • (1995) Econ. Theory , vol.5 , pp. 19-32
    • Dastidar, K.G.1
  • 3
    • 0040653630 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market
    • Dastidar K. G. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market. J. Econ. Theory. 75:1997;205-212.
    • (1997) J. Econ. Theory , vol.75 , pp. 205-212
    • Dastidar, K.G.1
  • 5
    • 0002448413 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment
    • Huck S., Normann H., Oechssler J. Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment. Econ. J. 109:1999;80-95.
    • (1999) Econ. J. , vol.109 , pp. 80-95
    • Huck, S.1    Normann, H.2    Oechssler, J.3
  • 6
    • 0034582213 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets?
    • Huck S., Normann H., Oechssler J. Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets? Int. J. Industrial Organization. 18:2000;39-57.
    • (2000) Int. J. Industrial Organization , vol.18 , pp. 39-57
    • Huck, S.1    Normann, H.2    Oechssler, J.3
  • 7
    • 0002730095 scopus 로고
    • Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
    • Kandori M., Mailath G. J., Rob R. Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games. Econometrica. 61:1993;29-56.
    • (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 29-56
    • Kandori, M.1    Mailath, G.J.2    Rob, R.3
  • 8
    • 0031286313 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Evolutionarily Stable Strategies?
    • Qin C.-Z., Stuart C. Are Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Evolutionarily Stable Strategies? J. Evol. Econ. 7:1997;41-47.
    • (1997) J. Evol. Econ. , vol.7 , pp. 41-47
    • Qin, C.-Z.1    Stuart, C.2
  • 9
    • 70350155605 scopus 로고
    • Theories of Oligopoly Behavior
    • R. Schmalensee, & R. Willig. Amsterdam: North-Holland
    • Shapiro C. Theories of Oligopoly Behavior. Schmalensee R., Willig R. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume I. 1989;329-414 North-Holland, Amsterdam.
    • (1989) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume I , pp. 329-414
    • Shapiro, C.1
  • 10
    • 0001728868 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
    • Vega-Redondo F. The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior. Econometrica. 65:1997;375-384.
    • (1997) Econometrica , vol.65 , pp. 375-384
    • Vega-Redondo, F.1
  • 11
    • 0001944917 scopus 로고
    • The Evolution of Conventions
    • Young P. The Evolution of Conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.
    • (1993) Econometrica , vol.61 , pp. 57-84
    • Young, P.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.