Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 558-573

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030295559     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0133     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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