A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 118-156

  Nöldeke, Georg ^a   Samuelson, Larry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031097182     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2239     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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