Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution

Economics Letters

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 165-170

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; C73; Decision rules; Equilibrium selection; Evolution; Learning; Markov chains

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032348452     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00163-3     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Kandori M., Mailath G.J., Rob R. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica. 61:1993;29-56.
2. Kandori M., Rob R. Evolution of equilibria in the long run: a general theory and applications. Journal of Economic Theory. 65:1995;383-414.
3. Rhode P., Stegeman M. A comment on 'Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games'. Econometrica. 64:1996;443-449.
4. Sandholm, W.H., 1996. Simple and clever decision rules in single population evolutionary models. CMS-EMS Discussion Paper #1158, Northwestern University.
5. Sandholm, W.H., 1998. Evolutionary justification of Nash equilibrium. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University.
6. Young H.P. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.