Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 523-543

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Schlag, Karl H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Discretization; Limit cycle; Matching pennies game; Replicator dynamics; Strictly improving

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034348033     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001910000049     Document Type: Article

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