Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-19

  Cressman, R ^a  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Monotone selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031205895     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00009-7     Document Type: Article

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