Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 1347-1374

  Mailath, George J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001281582     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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