Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 81-108

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001769604     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2696     Document Type: Article

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