An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 203-237

  Oechssler, Jörg ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256359     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0550     Document Type: Article

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