The evolution of walrasian behavior

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 375-384

  Vega Redondo, Fernando ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001728868     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171898     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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