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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 130-156

Why Imitate, and If So, How?: A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits

(1) Schlag, Karl H a

a UNIVERSITY OF BONN (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000861816 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2347 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (578)

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