Two competing models of how people learn in games

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 2141-2166

  Hopkins, Ed ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Fictitious play; Games; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PERTURBATION TECHNIQUES; RANDOM PROCESSES;

FICTITIOUS PLAY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0036434064     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00372     Document Type: Article

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