On the convergence of fictitious play

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 479-511

  Krishna, Vijay ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Fictitious play; Learning in games; Mixed strategy equilibria

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; PROBABILITY;

FICTITIOUS PLAY; MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; NON ZERO SUM GAME;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0032075278     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.23.2.479     Document Type: Article

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