Best response dynamics for role games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 527-538

  Berger, Ulrich ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Best Response Dynamics; Evolution; Learning; Role Games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036006565     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820200096     Document Type: Article

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