Seller reputation

Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 273-351

  Bar Isaac, Heski ^a   Tadelis, Steven ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049093445     PISSN: 15479846     EISSN: 15479854     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/0700000027     Document Type: Review

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