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Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 457-486

Economic insights from internet auctions

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EID: 4544275423     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/0022051041409075     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (310)

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