Observable reputation trading

International Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 693-730

  Hakenes, Hendrik ^a,c   Peitz, Martin ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^c MPI for Collective Goods   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34147117330     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00442.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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