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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 498-526
When is reputation bad?
Author keywords

Commitment; Game theory; Reputation; Stackelberg
Indexed keywords

EID: 44649113089     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.007     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (57)
References (15)
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    • Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Kreps, D.2    Maskin, E.3
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    • Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
    • Fudenberg D., and Levine D.K. Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players. J. Econ. Theory 62 (1994) 103-135
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.K.2
  • 7
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    • Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
    • Fudenberg D., and Levine D.K. Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992) 561-579
    • (1992) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.59 , pp. 561-579
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.K.2
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    • Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
    • Fudenberg D., and Levine D.K. Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player. Econometrica 57 (1989) 759-778
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , pp. 759-778
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.K.2
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    • The folk theorem with imperfect public information
    • Fudenberg D., Maskin E., and Levine D.K. The folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1039
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2    Levine, D.K.3
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    • Reputation and imperfect information
    • Kreps D., and Wilson R. Reputation and imperfect information. J. Econ. Theory 27 (1982) 253-279
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    • Kreps, D.1    Wilson, R.2
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    • Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
    • Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. J. Econ. Theory 27 (1982) 280-312
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    • Political correctness
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    • Reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games of conflicting interests
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    • Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
    • Sorin S. Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information. Games Econ. Behav. 29 (1999) 274-308
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.