The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 110, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 854-882

  Tadelis, Steven ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCENTIVE; MARKET CONDITIONS; RETIREMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036694274     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/340781     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Production, information costs, and economic organization
2. An overlapping generations model of electoral competition
3. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers
4. Cooperation in ongoing organizations
5. Reputation acquisition in debt markets
6. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
7. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence
8. The role of party reputation in the formation of policy
9. The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity
10. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective
11. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance
12. Corporate culture and economic theory
13. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
14. Why is there mandatory retirement?
15. Who wants a good reputation?
16. Executive compensation
17. What's in a name? Reputation as a tradeable asset
18. Firm reputation with hidden information