Something to prove: Reputation in teams

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 495-511

  Bar Isaac, Heski ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349032766     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00080.x     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. ALCHIAN, A.A. AND DEMSETZ, H. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization." American Economic Review, Vol. 62 (1972), pp. 777-795.
2. ANDERSON, A. AND SMITH, L. "Assortative Matching and Reputation." Mineo, Department of Economics, Georgetown University, 2004.
3. BAR-ISAAC, H. "On Reputation and the Interaction of Firm and Individual Reputations." Mineo, Department of Economics, Stern School of business, New York University, 2004a.
4. _. "Variations on the Central Model of Chapter 3." Appendix C of Reputation and Professional Services: Survival, Teams and Incentives, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2004b.
5. BRETON, M., ST. AMOUR, P., AND VENCATACHELLUM, D. "Inter- vs Intra-Generational Teams: A Young Worker's Perspective." Mineo, HEC Montréal, 2002.
6. _, AND _. "Dynamic Production Teams with Strategic Behavior." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 27 (2003), pp. 875-905.
7. COTTERMAN, J.D., ED. Compensation Plans for Law Firms. Chicago: Altman Weil Inc., American Bar Association, 2001.
8. CRÉMER, J. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101 (1986), pp. 33-55.
9. _. "Arm's Length Relationships." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (1995), pp. 275-295.
10. CRIPPS, M.W., MAILATH, G.J., AND SAMUELSON, L. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputation." Econometrica, Vol. 72 (2004), pp. 407-432.
11. FUDENBERG, D. AND LEVINE, D.K. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player." Econometrica, Vol. 57 (1989), pp. 759-778.
12. - AND _. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59 (1992), pp. 561-579.
13. GIBBONS, R. AND MURPHY, K.J. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100 (1992), pp. 468-505.
14. HAKENES, H. AND PEITZ, M. "Observable Reputation Trading." International Economic Review, Vol. 48 (2007), 693-730.
15. HOLMSTRÖM, B. "Moral Hazard in Teams." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13 (1982), pp. 324-340.
16. _. "Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66 (1999), Special Issue on Contracts, pp. 169-182.
17. JEON, S. "Moral Hazard and Reputational Concerns in Teams: Implications for Organizational Choice." International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14 (1996), pp. 297-315.
18. KAHN, C. AND HUBERMAN, G. "Two-Sided Uncertainty and Up-or-Out Contracts." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 6 (1988), pp. 423-444.
19. KLEIN, B. AND LEFFLER, K.B. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 (1981), pp. 615-641.
20. KREPS, D.M. "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory." In J.E. Alt and K.A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
21. _, MILGROM, P., ROBERTS, J., AND WILSON, R. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27 (1982), pp. 245-252.
22. _ AND WILSON, R. "Reputation and Imperfect Information." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27 (1982), pp. 253-279.
23. LEVIN, J. "Career Concerns and Collective Reputation." Mineo, Department of Economics, Stanford University, 2001.
24. _ AND TADELIS, S. "A Theory of Partnerships." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120 (2005), pp. 131-171.
25. MAILATH, G.J. AND SAMUELSON, L. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?" Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68 (2001), pp. 415-441.
26. MEYER, M. A. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (1994), pp. 1157-1184.
27. _, OLSEN, T.E., AND TORSVIK, G. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 31 (1996), pp. 401-417.
28. _ AND VICKERS, J. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105 (1997), pp. 547-581.
29. MILGROM, P. AND ROBERTS, J. "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27 (1982), pp. 280-312.
30. MORRISON, A.D. AND WILHELM, JR., W.J. "Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human Capital." American Economic Review, Vol. 94 (2004), pp. 1682-1692.
31. PRENDERGAST, C. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108 (1993), pp. 523-534.
32. _. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (1999), pp. 7-63.
33. REBITZER, J.B. AND TAYLOR, L.J. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 25 (2007), pp. 201-229.
34. TADELIS, S. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset." American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (1999), pp. 548-563.
35. _. "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110 (2002), pp. 854-882.
36. TIROLE, J. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63 (1996), pp. 1-22.
37. TURNOR, R. "Partnership and Members' Agreements." In T. Sacker, T., ed., A Practitioner's Guide to Partnership and LLP Law and Regulation. London: City & Financial Publishing, 2001.