A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-22

  Tirole, Jean ^a,b  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b CERAS

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002237355     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2298112     Document Type: Article

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