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Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 118, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 785-814

  Ely, Jeffrey C ^b   Välimäki, Juuso ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042863235     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/00335530360698423     Document Type: Review

References (25)

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