The wrong kind of transparency

American Economic Review

Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 862-877

  Prat, Andrea ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 30844436627     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201297     Document Type: Review

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