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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 130, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 27-43

Public trust and government betrayal

(1) Phelan, Christopher a

a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (United States)

Author keywords

Government reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748036073 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: 10957235 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (93)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.