Power in the firm and managerial career concerns

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-29

  Ortega, Jaime ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037339362     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864003321220715     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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