The economics of career concerns, part I: Comparing information structures

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 183-198

  Dewatripont, Mathias ^a   Jewitt, Ian ^b   Tirole, Jean ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

^c TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001510595     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00084     Document Type: Review

References (17)

1. DAS, P. and MULDER, P. G. H. (1983), "Regression to the Mode", Statistica Neerlandica, 37, 15-21.
2. DEWATRIPONT, M., JEWITT, I. and TIROLE, J. (1997), "Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies" (Mimeo).
3. GROSSMAN, S. and HART, O. (1983), "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem", Econometrica, 51, 7-45.
4. GUESNERIE, R. and LAFFONT, J. J. (1984), "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm", Journal of Public Economics, 25, 329-369.
5. HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1979), "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
6. HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1982a), "Moral Hazard in Teams", Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324-340.
7. HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1982b), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective", in Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck (Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics).
8. HOLMSTRÖM, B. and MILGROM, P. (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24-52.
9. JEWITT, I. (1987), "Risk Aversion and the Choice between Risky Projects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results", Review of Economic Studies, 54, 73-86.
10. JEWITT, I. (1988), "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems", Econometrica, 56, 1177-1190.
11. JEWITT, I. (1997), "Information and Principal-Agent Problems" (Mimeo, University of Bristol).
12. KIM, S. K. (1995), "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model", Econometrica, 63, 89-102.
13. LEHMAN, E. (1988), "Comparing Location Experiments", Annals of Statistics, 16, 521-533.
14. MIRRLEES, J. (1971), "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation", Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175-208.
15. MIRRLEES, J. (1999), "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour, Part I", Review of Economic Studies, 66, 3-21
16. SHAVELL, S. (1979), "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 55-73.
17. WILSON, J. Q. (1989), Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books).