Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 195-216

  Abreu, Dilip ^a   Sethi, Rajiv ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Barnard College of Columbia University   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Behavioral types; Evolution; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042659374     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00029-0     Document Type: Article

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