Moral hazard and reputational concerns in teams: Implications for organizational choice

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 297-315

  Jeon, Seonghoon ^a  

^a Sogang University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Moral hazard; Organizational choice; Reputation; Team

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344437481     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(95)00482-3     Document Type: Article

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