CEO severance agreements: A theoretical examination and research agenda

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 151-169

  Cowen, Amanda P ^a   King, Adelaide Wilcox ^a   Marcel, Jeremy J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84950349851     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2011.0435     Document Type: Article

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