What do interlocks do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 22, Issue , 1996, Pages 271-298

  Mizruchi, Mark S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Corporate interlocks; Corporations; Interorganizational relations; Social networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001427167     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.271     Document Type: Article

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