Managerial compensation and capital structure

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 549-584

  Berkovitch, Elazar ^a   Israel, Ronen ^a,b   Spiegel, Yossef ^c  

^a INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034359937     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864000567963     Document Type: Article

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