The elephant in the room: Labor market influences on ceo compensation

Personnel Psychology

Volumn 62, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 659-695

  Fulmer, Ingrid Smithy ^a  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449487527     PISSN: 00315826     EISSN: 17446570     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-6570.2009.01154.x     Document Type: Article

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