Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 1055-1078

  Sanders, W M Gerard ^a   Hambrick, Donald C ^b  

^a BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749081591     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2007.27156438     Document Type: Article

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