Determinants of CEO severance contracts and their components and the effects of severance contracts on executive turnover

Journal of Economics and Business

Volumn 62, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 257-272

  Van Dalsem, Shane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LA CROSSE   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Executive severance agreements; Executive turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953357858     PISSN: 01486195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2010.01.002     Document Type: Article

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