Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: An empirical investigation

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 29, Issue 8, 2008, Pages 859-872

  Zhang, Yan ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Board committees; CEO succession; Information asymmetry; New CEO dismissal

Indexed keywords

CERIUM ALLOYS; RISK MANAGEMENT;

ADVERSE SELECTION; BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BOD); EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; POLITICAL FACTORS;

PERSONNEL;

EID: 47749137314     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.689     Document Type: Article

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