Explicit versus implicit contracts: Evidence from CEO employment agreements

Journal of Finance

Volumn 64, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1629-1655

  Gillan, Stuart L ^a   Hartzell, Jay C ^b   Parrino, Robert ^b  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68249158391     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x     Document Type: Article

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