CEO replacement under private information

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 2935-2969

  Inderst, Roman ^a   Mueller, Holger M ^b  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954998069     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq018     Document Type: Article

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