Incentives: Motivation and the economics of information

Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-603

  Campbell, Donald E ^a  

^a Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84923948979     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511617430     Document Type: Book

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