Lawlessness and economics: Alternative modes of governance

Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Dixit, Avinash ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884116339     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (152)

1. Abreu, Dilip. 1986. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. Journal of Economic Theory 39:191-225.
2. Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti. 1990. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica 59:1713-1733.
3. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. Colonial origins of economic development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91:1369-1401.
4. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Yunyong Thaicharoen. 2002. Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises, and growth. Working paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
5. Alchian, Armen A. 1965. Some economics of property rights. Il Politico 50:16-29. (Reprinted in Armen A. Alchian. 1977. Economic forces at work. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press.)
6. Alston, Lee J., Thráinn Eggertson, and Douglass C. North. 1996. Empirical studies in institutional change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
7. Anderson, James E. and Oriana Bandiera. 2002. Private enforcement and social efficiency. Working paper, Boston College, Boston, MA and London School of Economics, London, UK.
8. Aoki, Masahiko. 2001. Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Axelord, Robert. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
10. Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker. 1994. Game theory and the law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
11. Baker, George. 1992. Incentive contracts and performance measurement. Journal of Political Economy 100:598-614.
12. Baker, George. 2002. Distortion and risk in optimal incentive contracts. Journal of Human Resources 37:728-751.
13. Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1994. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1125-1156.
14. Baker, George. 2002. Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:39-84.
15. Bandiera, Oriana. 2003. Land reform, the market for protection and the origins of the Sicilian Mafia: theory and evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19:218-244.
16. Barzel, Yoram. 1989. Economic analysis of property rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
17. Barzel, Yoram. 2002. A theory of the state: economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
18. Bearak, Barry. 2000. In India, the wheels of justice hardly move. New York Times June 1:A1.
19. Becker, Gary S. 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76:169-217.
20. Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Vijay Krishna. 1985. Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53:905-922.
21. Berger, Helge. 1997. The Bundesbank's path to independence: evidence from the 1950s. Public Choice 93:427-453.
22. Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael Whinston. 1990. Multimarket contact and business behavior. Rand Journal of Economics 21:1-26.
23. Bernstein, Lisa. 1992. Opting out of the legal system: extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry. Journal of Legal Studies 21:115-157.
24. Bernstein, Lisa. 2001. Private commercial law in the cotton industry: creating cooperation through rules, norms, and institutions. Michigan Law Review 99:1724-1788.
25. Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2002. Optimal parochialism: the dynamics of trust and exclusion in networks. Working paper, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
26. Calvert, Randall L. 1995a. The rational choice theory of social institutions: cooperation, communication, and coordination. In Modern political economy: old topics, new directions, ed. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, pp. 216-267. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
27. Calvert, Randall L. 1995b. Rational actors, equilibrium, and social institutions. In Explaining social institutions, ed. Jack Knight and Itai Sened, pp. 57-93. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
28. Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
29. Casella, Alessandra. 1996. On market integration and the development of institutions: the case of international commercial arbitration. European Economic Review 40:155-186.
30. Casella, Alessandra and James E. Rauch. 2002. Anonymous market and group ties in international trade. Journal of International Economics 58:19-47.
31. Chancellor, Edward. 1999. Devil take the hindmost: a history of financial speculation. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
32. Charny, David. 1990. Nonlegal sanctions in commercial relationships. Harvard Law Review 104:373-466.
33. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4:386-406.
34. Coase, Ronald. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 13:49-70.
35. Coase, Ronald. 1988. The firm, the market, and the law. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
36. Conley, Timothy and Christopher Udry. 2001. Social learning through networks: the adoption of new agricultural technologies in Ghana. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83:668-683.
37. Cooter, Robert D. 1994. Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: a model of decentralized law. International Review of Law and Economics 14:215-231.
38. Cooter, Robert D. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1989. Economic analysis of legal disputes and their resolution. Journal of Economic Literature 27:1067-1097.
39. Dasgupta, Partha S. 1988. Trust as a commodity. In Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations, ed. Diego Gambetta, pp. 49-71. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
40. Demsetz, Harold. 1967. Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review 57:347-359.
41. De Soto, Hernando. 1989. The other path: the invisible revolution in the third world. New York: HarperCollins.
42. De Soto, Hernando. 2000. Mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. New York: Basic Books.
43. Dezalay, Yves and Bryant G. Garth. 1996. Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration and the construction of a transnational order. Chicago, IL and London, UK: University of Chicago Press.
44. Dixit, Avinash. 1996. The making of economic policy: a transaction cost politics perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
45. Dixit, Avinash. 1997. Power of incentives in public versus private organizations. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 87:378-382.
46. Dixit, Avinash. 2003a. On modes of economic governance. Econometrica 71:449-481. (A longer working paper version is available at http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/wrkps.html.)
47. Dixit, Avinash. 2003b. Trade expansion and contract enforcement. Journal of Political Economy 111:1293-1317.
48. Dixit, Avinash. 2003c. Two-tier market institutions. Working paper, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
49. Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath. 2004. Games of strategy, 2nd edn. New York: W.W. Norton.
50. Djankov, Simeon and Peter Murrell. 2002. Enterprise restructuring in transition: a quantitative survey. Journal of Economic Literature 40:739-792.
51. Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton.
52. Dugatkin, Lee. 1999. Cheating monkeys and citizen bees: the nature of cooperation in animals and humans. New York: Simon and Schuster.
53. Eggertson, Thráinn. 1996. A note on the economics of institutions. In Empirical studies in institutional change, ed. Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertson, and Douglass C. North, pp. 6-24. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
54. Ellickson, Robert C. 1989. A hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms: evidence from the whaling industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5:83-97.
55. Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order without law: how neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
56. Ellison, Glenn. 1994. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. Review of Economic Studies 61:567-588.
57. Ensminger, Jean. 1992. Making a market: the institutional transformation of an African society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
58. Ensminger, Jean. 1997. Changing property rights: reconciling formal and informal rights to land in Africa. In The frontiers of the new institutional economics, ed. John N. Drobak and John V. C. Nye, pp. 165-196. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
59. Fafchamps, Marcel. 2002. Spontaneous market emergence. Topics in Theoretical Economics 2:1-33.
60. Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 90:980-994.
61. Ferguson, Niall. 1998. The house of Rothschild, Vol. I. Money's prophets 1798-1848. New York: Viking Press.
62. Ferguson, Niall. 1999. The house of Rothschild, Vol. II. The world's banker 1849-1999. New York: Viking Press.
63. Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
64. Fudenberg, Drew and Eric Maskin. 1986. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54:533-554.
65. Gambetta, Diego. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia: the business of protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
66. Ghosh, Parikshit and Debraj Ray. 1996. Cooperation in community interaction without information flows. Review of Economic Studies 63:491-519.
67. Gibbons, Robert. 1997. Incentives and careers in organizations. In Advances in economics and econometrics, Vol. II, ed. David M. Kreps and Kenneth F.Wallis, pp. 1-37. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
68. Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510.
69. Greif, Avner. 1993. Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders' coalition. American Economic Review 83:525-548.
70. Greif, Avner. 1994. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. Journal of Political Economy 102:912-950.
71. Greif, Avner. 1997a. Contracting, enforcement, and efficiency: economics beyond the law. In Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, ed. Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, pp. 239-265. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
72. Greif, Avner. 1997b. On the interrelations and economic implications of economic, social, political and normative factors: reflections from two late medieval societies. In The frontiers of the new institutional economics, ed. John N. Drobak and JohnV. C. Nye, pp. 57-84. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
73. Greif, Avner. 2000. The fundamental problem of exchange: a research agenda in historical institutional analysis. European Review of Economic History 4:251-284.
74. Greif, Avner. 2003. Institutions and impersonal exchange: the European experience. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
75. Grossman, Herschel I. 1995. Rival kleptocrats: the Mafia versus the state. In The economics of organized crime, ed. G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
76. Grossman, Herschel I. 2002. Make us a king: anarchy, predation, and the state. European Journal of Political Economy 18:31-46.
77. Grossman, Herschel I. and Minseong Kim. 1985. Swords or ploughshares? A theory of security of the claims to property. Journal of Political Economy 103:1275-1288.
78. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart. 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51:7-45.
79. Guinnane, Timothy W. 2003. Afailed institutional transplant: Raiffeisen's credit cooperatives in Ireland, 1894-1914. Explorations in Economic History 31:38-61.
80. Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:83-116.
81. Hammett, Dashiel. 1930. The Maltese falcon. New York: Knopf.
82. Hay, Jonathan R. and Andrei Shleifer. 1998. Private enforcement of public laws: a theory of legal reform. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 98:398-403.
83. Hendley, Katherine and Peter Murrell. 2003. Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreement? Asking decision-makers in firms. Economics Letters 78:49-54.
84. Hendley, Katherine, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman. 2001. Law works in Russia: the role of law in interenterprise transactions. In Assessing the value of law in transition economies, ed. Peter Murrell, pp. 56-93. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
85. Hirshleifer, Jack. 2001. The dark side of the force: economic foundations of conflict theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
86. Hirshleifer, Jack and John G. Riley. 1992. The analytics of uncertainty and information. New York: Cambridge University Press.
87. Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff. 2002. Courts and relational contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18:221-277.
88. Kali, Raja. 2002. Social embeddedness, modernization and markets: a small world approach to economic governance. Working paper, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR.
89. Kandori, Michihiro. 1992. Social norms and community enforcement. Review of Economic Studies 59:61-80.
90. Kaufman, Daniel and Aart Kraay. 2002. Growth without governance. Economia 3:169-229.
91. Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2003. Governance matters III: governance indicators for 1996-2002. Manuscript. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
92. Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics 21:297-326.
93. Kranton, Rachel. 1996. Reciprocal exchange: a self-sustaining system. American Economic Review 86:830-851.
94. Landes, William M. and Richard A. Posner. 1979. Adjudication as a private good. Journal of Law and Economics 8:235-284.
95. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106:1113-1155.
96. La Porta, Rafael. 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15:222-279.
97. Li, John Shuhe. 2003. The benefits and costs of relation-based governance: an explanation of the East Asian miracle and crisis. Review of International Economics 11:651-673.
98. Li, Shuhe and Peng Lian. 1999. Governance and investment: why can China attract largescale FDI despite its widespread corruption? Working paper, City University of Hong Kong.
99. Liebcap, Gary D. 1989. Contracting for property rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
100. Macaulay, Stewart. 1963. Non-contractual relationships in business: a preliminary study. American Sociological Review 28:55-70.
101. Marin, Dalia and Monika Schnitzer. 2002. Contracts in trade and transition: the resurgence of barter. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
102. Mas Colell, Andreu, Michael Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
103. Mattli, Walter. 2001. Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration. International Organization 55:919-947.
104. McMillan, John. 2002. Reinventing the bazaar. New York: W.W. Norton.
105. McMillan, John and Christopher Woodruff. 1999. Dispute prevention without courts in Vietnam. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15:637-658.
106. McMillan, John. 2000. Private order under dysfunctional public order. Michigan Law Review98:2421-2458.
107. Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R.Weingast. 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the Champagne fairs. Economics and Politics 2:1-23.
108. Mirrlees, James A. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175-208.
109. Mookherjee, Dilip and Ivan Png. 1989. Optimal auditing, insurance, and redistribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104:399-415.
110. Murrell, Peter. 1996. Howfar has the transition progressed? Journal of EconomicPerspectives 10:25-44.
111. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
112. North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England. Journal of Economic History 49:803-832.
113. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
114. Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review 87:567-576.
115. Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein. 1994. A course in game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
116. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press.
117. Pearce, David G. 1992. Repeated games: cooperation and rationality. In Advances in Economic Theory: 6th World Congress, Vol. I, ed. Jean-Jacqes Laffont, pp. 132-174. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
118. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics: explaining economic policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
119. Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 2000. Institutions, social norms, and economic development. London: Routledge.
120. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. 2000. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 38:45-76.
121. Posner, Richard A. 2002. Economic analysis of law, 6th edn. New York: Aspen.
122. Posner, Richard A. and Francesco Parisi, eds. 1997. Law and economics, Vols I-III. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
123. Prendergast, Canice. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37:7-63.
124. Pritchett, Lant. 2003. A toy collection, a socialist star, and a democratic dud? Growth theory, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In In search of prosperity: analytic narratives on economic growth, ed. Dani Rodrik, pp. 123-151. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
125. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
126. Rasmusen, Eric. 2000. Games and information, 3rd edn. Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
127. Rauch, James. 2001. Business and social networks in international trade. Journal of Economic Literature 39:1177-1203.
128. Rodrik, Dani. 1995. Getting intervention right: how South Korea and Taiwan grew rich. Economic Policy 20:53-101.
129. Rodrik, Dani. 2000. Institutions for high quality growth: what they are and how to acquire them. Studies in Comparative International Development 35:3-31.
130. Rodrik, Dani, ed. 2003. In search of prosperity: analytical narratives on economic growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
131. Rubin, Paul H. 1994. Growing a legal system in the post-communist economies. Cornell International Law Journal 27:1-47.
132. Sachs, Jeffrey and Warner, Andrew. 2001. The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review 45:827-838.
133. Schotter, Andrew. 1981. The economic theory of social institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
134. Schwartz, Alan. 1992. Relational contracts in the courts: an analysis of incomplete agreements and judicial strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21:271-318.
135. Shavell, Steven. 1982. Suit, settlement, and trial: a theoretical analysis under alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs. Journal of Legal Studies 11:55-81.
136. Shelling, Thomas C. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press.
137. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. The grabbing hand: government pathologies and their cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
138. Sobel, Joel. 2002. Can we trust social capital? Journal of Economic Literature 40:139-154.
139. Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. History lessons: institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the newworld. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:217-232.
140. Solow, Robert M. 1974. The economics of resources or the resources of economics. American Economic Review 64 (Papers and Proceedings): 1-14.
141. Stigler, George. 1988. Law or economics? Journal of Law and Economics 35:455-468.
142. Strouse, Jean. 2000. Morgan: American financier. New York: HarperCollins.
143. Tornell, Aaron and Philip R. Lane. 1998. Are windfalls a curse? A non-representative agent model of the current account. Journal of International Economics 44:83-112.
144. Townsend, Robert. 1979. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification. Journal of Economic Theory 22:265-293.
145. Varese, Federico. 2001. The Russian Mafia: private protection in a new market economy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
146. Whiting, Robert. 1999. Tokyo underworld. New York: Random House.
147. Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22:233-261.
148. Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
149. Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
150. Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature 38:595-613.
151. Wright, Robert. 2000. Nonzero: the logic of human destiny. Pantheon.
152. Young, H. Peyton. 1998. Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.