Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 432-478

  Riley, John G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000486899     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Acharya, Sankarshan. 1988. "A Generalized Econometric Model and Tests of a Signaling Hypothesis with Two Discrete Signals," J. Finance 53:2, pp. 413-29.
2. Ackerberg, Daniel. 1996. "Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experienced Good Markets: An Empirical Examination," mimeo, Yale U.
3. Admati, Anat R. and Motty Perry. 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Rev. Econ. Stud. 54:3, pp. 345-64.
4. Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," Quart. J. Econ. 84:3, pp. 488-500.
5. Allen, Franklin and Gerald R. Faulhaber. 1989. "Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market," J. Finan. Econ. 23:2, pp. 303-23.
6. Ambarish, Ramasastry; Kose John and Joseph Williams. 1987. "Efficient Signaling with Dividends and Investments," J. Finance 92:2, pp. 321-43.
7. Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Raymond J. Deneckere. 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica 57:3, pp. 511-31.
8. Backus, David and John Driffill. 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," Amer. Econ. Rev. 75:3, pp. 530-38.
9. Bagwell, Kyle and Garey Ramey. 1988. "Advertising and Limit Pricing," Rand J. Econ. 19:1, pp. 59-71.
10. Bagwell, Kyle and Michael H. Riordan. 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:1, 224-39.
11. Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990a. "A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information," J. Econ. Theory 50:2, pp. 309-25.
12. _. 1990b. "Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information," Quart. J. Econ. 104:2, pp. 445-64.
13. Banks, Jeffrey S. and Joel Sobel. 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica 55:3, pp. 647-61.
14. Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford W. Smith Jr. 1995. "The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities," J. Finance 50:3, pp. 899-917.
15. Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon. 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," J. Monetary Econ. 12:1, pp. 101-21.
16. Bernhardt, Dan and David Scoones. 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," Amer. Econ. Rev. 83:4, pp. 771-90.
17. Bhattacharya, Sudipto. 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy and 'The Bird in the Hand' Fallacy," Bell J. Econ. 9:1, pp. 259-70.
18. Brennan, Michael and Alan Kraus. 1987. "Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," J. Finance 42:5, pp. 1225-43.
19. Cameron, Charles M. and Peter B. Rosendorff. 1993. "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Games Econ. Behavior 5:1, pp. 44-70.
20. Cho, In-Koo and David M. Kreps. 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Quart. J. Econ. 102:2, pp. 179-221.
21. Cho, In-Koo and Joel Sobel. 1990. "Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games," J. Econ. Theory 50:2, pp. 381-413.
22. Constantinedes, George M. and Bruce D. Grundy. 1990. "Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals," Rev. Finan. Stud. 2:4, pp. 445-65.
23. Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer. 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica 54:5, pp. 1099-128.
24. Daughety, Andrew F. and Jennifer F. Reinganum. 1994. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Model," Int. Econ. Rev. 35:4, pp. 795-819.
25. Drazen, Allan and Paul R. Masson. 1994. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," Quart. J. Econ. 109:3 , pp. 735-54.
26. Franke, Gunther. 1987. "Costless Signaling in Financial Markets," J. Finance 42:4, pp. 809-22.
27. Friedland, J. Eric and Roger D. Little. 1981. "Self-Employed Workers: Returns to Education and Training," Econ. Ed. Rev. 1:3, pp. 315-37.
28. Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. 1986. "A 'Signal-jamming' Theory of Predation," Rand J. Econ. 17:3, pp. 366-76.
29. Gal-Or, Esther. 1989. "Warranties as a Signal of Quality," Canadian J. Econ. 22:1, pp. 50-61.
30. Gerstner, Eitan. 1985. "Do Higher Prices Signal Higher Quality?" J. Marketing Res. 22:2 , pp. 209-15.
31. Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence F. Katz. 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," J. Lab. Econ. 9:4, pp. 351-81.
32. Gonedes, N.J. 1978. "Corporate Signaling, External Accounting and Capital Market Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income and Extraordinary Items," J. Acc. Res. 16:1, pp. 26-79.
33. Goswami, Gautam; Thomas Noe, and Michael Rebello. 1995. "Debt Financing under Asymmetric Information," J. Finance 50:2, pp. 633-59.
34. Grinblatt, Mark and Chuan Yang Hwang. 1989. "Signaling and the Pricing of New Issues," J. Finance 44:2, pp. 393-420.
35. Groot, Wim and Oosterbeek, Hessel. 1994. "Earnings Effects of Different Components of Schooling: Human Capital versus Screening," Rev. Econ. Statist. 76:2, pp. 317-21.
36. Grossman, Sanford J. 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," J. Law Econ. 24:3, pp. 461-83.
37. Grossman, Sanford and Motty Perry. 1986a. "Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," J. Econ. Theory 39:1, pp. 120-54
38. _. 1986b. "Perfect Sequential Equilibrium," J. Econ. Theory 39:1, pp. 97-119.
39. Gull, Faruk; Hugo Sonnenschein, and Robert Wilson. 1986. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," J. Econ. Theory 39:1 pp. 155-90.
40. Harrington, Joseph E. Jr. 1986. "Limit Pricing When the Potential Entrant Is Uncertain," Econometrica 54:2, pp. 429-37.
41. _. 1993. "The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises," Games Econ. Behav. 5:1, pp. 71-97.
42. Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv. 1985. "A Sequential Signaling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy," J. Finance 40:5, pp. 1263-81.
43. _. 1991. "The Theory of Capital Structure," J. Finance, 46:1, pp. 297-355.
44. Heinkel, Robert. 1982. "A Theory of Capital Structure Relevance under Imperfect Information," J. Finance 37:5, pp. 1141-50.
45. Hellwig, Martin. 1987. "Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection," Europ. Econ. Rev. 31:1-2, pp. 319-25.
46. Heywood, John S. 1994. "How Widespread are Sheepskin Returns to Education in the U.S.?" Econ. Ed. Rev. 13:3, pp. 227-34.
47. Hjorth-Andersen, C. 1991. "Quality Indicators in Theory and in Fact," Europ. Econ. Rev. 35:8, pp. 1491-505.
48. Hungerford, Thomas and Gary Solon. 1987. "Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education," Rev. Econ. Statist. 69:1, pp. 175-77.
49. Ibbotson, Roger G. 1975. "Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues," J. Finan. Econ. 2:3, pp. 235-72.
50. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan; Mark Weinstein and Ivo Welch. 1993. "An Empirical Investigation of IPO Returns and Subsequent Equity Offerings," J. Finan. Econ. 34:2, pp. 153-75.
51. John, Kose and Joseph Williams. 1985. "Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signaling Equilibrium," J. Finance 40:4, pp. 1053-69.
52. Kandoori, M.; George J. Mailath, and Rafael Rob. 1993. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica 61:1, pp. 29-56.
53. Kennan, John and Robert Wilson. 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," J. Appl. Econometrics 4:sup. pp. s87-s130.
54. Kihlstrom, Richard E. and Michael H. Riordan. 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," J. Polit. Econ. 92:3, pp. 427-50.
55. Kirman, William I. and Robert T. Masson. 1986. "Capacity Signals and Entry Deterrence," Int. J. Ind. Org. 4:1, pp. 25-42.
56. Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler. 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in assuring Contractual Performance," J. Polit. Econ. 89:4 , pp. 615-41.
57. Klitgaard, Robert. 1991. Adjusting to Reality. San Francisco: ICS Press.
58. Kohlberg, Elon and Jean-Francois Mertens. 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica 54:5, pp. 1003-38.
59. Kreps, David and Robert Wilson. 1982a. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica 50:4, pp. 863-94.
60. _. 1982b. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," J. Econ. Theory 27:2, pp. 253-79.
61. Lang, Kevin and David Kropp. 1986. "Human Capital versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws," Quart. J. Econ. 101:3, pp. 609-24.
62. Lang, Larry H. P. and Robert H. Litzenberger. 1989. "Dividend Announcements. Cash Flow Signaling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?" J. Finan. Econ. 24:1, pp. 181-91.
63. Layard, Richard and George Psacharopoulos. 1974. "The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education," J. Polit. Econ. 82:5, pp. 985-99.
64. LeBlanc, Greg. 1992. "Signaling Strength: Limit Pricing and Predatory Pricing," Rand J. Econ. 23:4, pp. 493-506.
65. Leland, Hayne E. and David H. Pyle. 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," J. Finance 32:2, pp. 371-87.
66. Lewis, Karen K. 1995. "Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related, and Does It Really Matter?" J. Bus. 68:2, pp. 185-214.
67. Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87:2, pp. 319-33.
68. Lucas, Deborah J. and Robert McDonald. 1990. "Equity Issues and Stock Price Dynamics," J. Finance 45:4, pp. 1019-43.
69. Lutz, Nancy A. 1989. "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard" Rand J. Econ. 20:2, pp. 239-55.
70. Ma, Ching-to Albert and Andrew M. Weiss. 1993. "A Signaling Theory of Unemployment," Europ. Econ. Rev. 37:1, pp. 135-57.
71. Mailath, George J. 1989. "Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model," Quart. J. Econ. 104:2, pp. 417-27.
72. _. 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions," J. Econ. Theory 59:1, 169-82.
73. Mailath, George J.; Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Andrew Postlewaite. 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," J. Econ. Theory 60:2, pp. 241-76.
74. Masson, Paul R. 1995. "Gaining and Losing ERM Credibility: The Case of the United Kingdom," Econ. J. 105:2, pp. 571-82.
75. McConnell, Sheena. 1989 "Strikes, Wages and Private Information," Amer. Econ. Rev. 79:4, pp. 801-15.
76. Milgrom, Paul and Sharon Oster. 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Quart. J. Econ. 102:3, pp. 453-476.
77. Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," J. Polit. Econ. 94:4, pp. 796-821.
78. _. 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica 50:2, pp. 443-59.
79. Miller, Merton H. and Kevin Rock. 1985. "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," J. Finance 40:4, pp. 1031-51.
80. Mirrlees, James. 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Rev. Econ. Stud. 38:2, pp. 175-208.
81. Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas Majluf. 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have," J. Finan. Econ. 13:2, pp. 187-221.
82. Myerson, Roger. 1978. "Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Int. J. Game Theory 7:1, pp. 73-80
83. Narayanan, M. P. 1988. "Debt versus Equity under Asymmetric Information," J. Finan. Quant. Anal. 23:1, pp. 39-51.
84. Nelson, Phillip. 1974. "Advertising as Information," J. Polit. Econ. 82:4, pp. 729-54.
85. Noe, Thomas H. 1989. "Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria," Rev. Finan. Stud. 1:4, pp. 331-55.
86. Noldeke, Georg and Larry Samuelson (1997), "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," J. Econ. Theory 73:1, pp. 118-56.
87. Noldeke, Georg and Eric Van Damme. 1990. "Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market," Rev. Econ. Stud. 57:1 , pp. 1-23.
88. Ofer, Aharon R. and Ashok Natarajan. 1987. "Convertible Call Policies: an Empirical Analysis of an Information-Signaling Hypothesis," J. Finan. Econ. 19:1, pp. 91-108.
89. Ofer, Aharon. R. and Siegel Daniel. 1987. "Corporate Financial Policy, Information and Market Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of Dividends," J. Finance 42:4, pp. 889-911.
90. Persson, Torsten and Sweder van Wijnbergen. 1993. "Signaling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy," Econ. J. 103:1, pp. 79-97.
91. Riley, John G. 1975. "Competitive Signalling," J. Econ. Theory 10:2, pp. 174-86.
92. _. 1979a. "Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis," J. Polit. Econ. 87:5, s227-s252.
93. _. 1979b. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, 47:2, pp. 331-59.
94. _. 1985. "Competition with Hidden Knowledge," J. Polit. Econ. 93:5, pp. 958-76.
95. Roberts, John. 1986. "A Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing," Oxford Econ. Pap. 38:1, pp. 75-93.
96. Rock, Kevin. 1986. "Why New Issues Are Underpriced," J. Finan. Econ. 15:1-2, pp. 187-212.
97. Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform Via Signaling," Econ. J. 99:3, pp. 756-72.
98. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," Amer. Econ. Rev. 80:1, pp. 21-36.
99. Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Siebert. 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Rev. Econ. Stud. 55:1, pp. 1-16.
100. Ross, Stephen A. 1977. "The Determination of Financial Structure," Bell J. Econ. 8:1, pp. 23-40.
101. Rothschild, Michael and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," Quart. J. Econ. 90:4, pp. 629-49.
102. Rubinstein Ariel. 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, 50:1, pp. 97-110.
103. Sobel, Joel and Ichiro Takehashi. 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Rev. Econ. Stud. 50:3, pp. 411-26.
104. Spence, A. Michael. 1977a. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," Rev. Econ. Stud. 44:3, pp. 561-72.
105. _. 1977b. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopoly Pricing," Bell J. Econ. 10:1, pp. 1-19.
106. _. 1973. "Job Market Signaling," Quart. J. Econ. 87:3, pp. 355-79.
107. Taubman, Paul J. and Terence J. Wales. 1973. "Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening," J. Polit. Econ. 81:1, pp. 28-55.
108. Vermaelen, Theo. 1981. "Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An Empirical Analysis," J. Finan. Econ. 9:2, pp. 139-83.
109. Vickers, John. 1986. "Signaling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Econ. Pap. 38:3, pp. 443-55.
110. Vickrey William. 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders," J. Finance 16:1, pp. 41-50.
111. Waldman, Michael. 1984. "Job Assignments, Signaling and Efficiency," Rand J. Econ. 15:2, pp. 255-67.
112. _. 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," J. Labor Econ. 8:2, pp. 230-50.
113. Welch, Ivo. 1989. "Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings," J. Finance 44:2, pp. 421-49.
114. Weiss, Andrew. 1983. "A Sorting-cum-learning Model of Education," J. Polit. Econ. 91:3, pp. 420-42.
115. Wernerfelt, Birger. 1988. "Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signaling by Posting a Bond," Rand J. Econ. 19:3, pp. 458-66.
116. Williams, Joseph. 1988. "Efficient Signaling with Dividends, Investment, and Stock Repurchases," J. Finance 43:3, pp. 737-47.
117. Wiener, Joshua L. 1985. "Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability?" J. Cons. Res. 12:2, pp. 245-50.
118. Wilson, Charles A. 1977. "A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information," J. Econ. Theory 16:2, pp. 167-207.
119. Wolpin, Kenneth I. 1977. "Education and Screening," Amer. Econ. Rev. 67:5, pp. 949-58.
120. Young, H. Peyton. 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica 61:1, pp. 57-84.