Chapter 67 Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2008, Pages 625-643

  Chen, Yan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71549115021     PISSN: 15740722     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00067-4     Document Type: Review

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