How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 4-5, 2002, Pages 829-845

  Klemperer, Paul ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

3G; Antitrust; Auctions; Bidding; Collusion; Entry; Mobile phones; Spectrum auctions; Telecommunications; UMTS

Indexed keywords

TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

EID: 0036260755     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00218-5     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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10. Auction theory: A guide to the literature
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12. Spectrum on the block
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14. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding: II
15. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trade