Chapter 1 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 1, Issue , 2002, Pages 35-94

  Campbell, Donald E ^a   Kelly, Jerry S ^b  

^a The College of William and Mary   (United States)

^b SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Arrow; impossibility; information; Pareto; trade off

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649306588     PISSN: 15740110     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0110(02)80005-4     Document Type: Review

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