The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour: Part I

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 3-21

  Mirrlees, J A ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17944372415     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00075     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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4. MIRRLEES, J. A. (1972), "Population Policy and the Taxation of Family Size", Journal of Public Economics, 1, 169-198.
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7. PAULY, M. V. (1968), "The Economics of Moral Hazard", American Economic Review, 58, 531-537.
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9. ROSS, S. (1973b), "On the Economic Theory of Agency", Proceedings of the NBER Conference on Decision Making and Uncertainty.
10. RADNER, R. (1968), "Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty", Econometrica, 36, 31-58.
11. SPENCE, M. and ZECKHAUSER, R. (1971), "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action", American Economic Review, 61, 380-387.
12. STIGLITZ, J. E. (1974), "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Share Cropping", Review of Economics Studies, 41, 219-256.
13. STIGLITZ, J. E. (1975), "Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy", Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 552-579.
14. ZECKHAUSER, R. (1970), "Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives", Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 10-26.