The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model

The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

Volumn 9781400829453, Issue , 2009, Pages 1-421

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Martimort, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84923993122     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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